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WHAT ARE THE ODDS? THE POTENTIAL FOR TRIBAL
CONTROL OF SPORTS GAMBLING AFTER MURPHY v.
NCAA
Haley Maynard*
I. Introduction
Professional and amateur sports have historically been somewhat of a
triple threat, operating as a source of entertainment, pride, and revenue for
athletes, fans, and government entities alike. Congress passed the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) in 1992 to
prevent states from authorizing sports betting in an attempt to protect the
integrity of sporting events.1 This federal regulation took power away from
the states to unilaterally choose their stance on sports gambling until May
14, 2018, when the Supreme Court ruled on the Act’s constitutionality after
several attempts by the State of New Jersey to enact legislation allowing for
sports betting and gambling within their borders.2 New Jersey’s roll of the
dice opened the door for state, federal, and tribal regimes to evaluate the
opportunities and challenges associated with execution and regulation of
sports betting moving forward. This Note will briefly discuss the history of
sports betting in the United States, the enactment and purpose of the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, New Jersey’s legal history
involving the Act, the decision of the Supreme Court in Murphy v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association, and why this decision could make Indian
tribes the ideal sports bookies.
II. Brief Introduction to Gambling History and Perception
in the United States
Gambling law in the United States can best be described as a wild card,
with perception and legality of the high stakes game changing throughout
the years.3 “Games of chance” have been utilized since the beginning of
American history, as settlers used these games as a way to generate funds

*
1.
2.
3.

Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012).
See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
See id. at 1468–69.
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for the establishment of the colonies, in addition to entertainment.4 Revenue
from gaming, usually in the form of lotteries, was used by colonists to
“build cities, establish universities, and even to help finance the
Revolutionary War.”5 Though such forms of gambling were generally
approved of early on, the acceptance of gambling, customarily a stateregulated activity, began to fade in the nineteenth century, and by the
beginning of the twentieth century gambling was largely outlawed
throughout the country.6 The Great Depression, however, forced states in
desperate need of revenue to reconsider gambling, which once again led to
the legalization of certain gaming operations within the states.7 For
example, New Jersey, the state that challenged PASPA in Murphy v.
NCCA, outright banned gambling in their constitution in 1897, but
beginning in 1929, the effect of the Great Depression led them to rethink
their stance on games of chance.8 In an effort to increase revenue, the state
authorized horse racing betting, which was followed soon thereafter by
bingo games at church forums and nonprofit organizations and a state
lottery system.9
Atlantic City, New Jersey’s most notable tourist attraction, began to view
casino gambling as an opportunity to regain status in the 1960s after years
of economic downturn deterred business.10 The city’s need to revitalize led
to a failed referendum to legalize casinos statewide, but received a second
wind in 1976 when voters approved city-specific legalization for casinos in
Atlantic City.11 Nevada was the only other state operating legal gambling
casinos at that time, which meant that Atlantic City essentially held a
monopoly over the eastern coast of the United States for casino gambling
4. A History of American Gaming Laws, HG.ORG LEGAL RESOURCES, https://www.hg.
org/legal-articles/a-history-of-american-gaming-laws-31222 (last visited Sept. 25, 2018).
5. Chil Woo, Note, All Bets Are Off: Revisiting the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act (PASPA), 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 569, 571 (2013) (quoting Ronald J.
Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical Examination of State Sponsored
Gambling, 34 B.C.L. REV. 11, 12 (1992)).
6. A History of American Gaming Laws, supra note 4.
7. Woo, supra note 5, at 572 (citing ROGER DUNSTAN, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, NO.
CRB-97-003, GAMBLING IN CALIFORNIA ch. 2 (1997), https://web.archive.org/web/|
20100206012146/http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/03/Chapt2.html (“History of Gambling
in the United States”)).
8. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1469.
9. Id.
10. David G. Schwartz, Atlantic City’s History of Second Chances & Salt Water Taffy,
FORBES (Jun. 28, 2018, 8:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidschwartz/2018/06/28/
why-we-should-all-be-rooting-for-atlantic-city-today/#142d9d6a6529.
11. Id.; see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1469.
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operations.12 The scarcity of gambling destinations in the United States
resulted in a boom of gambling tourism in Atlantic City.13
In addition to state approved gaming operations, Indian tribes utilized
small scale gaming activities until the passage of the “Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act” on October 17, 1988, when casinos on tribal land became
the norm.14 Although legal gambling casinos operated in select states and
on Indian land, Nevada was the only state in which legal sports gambling
inside casinos existed.15 Sports betting has informally been a part of the
sports industry since the establishment of professional and amateur leagues
in the United States in the late nineteenth century.16 Participating in sports
betting has consistently been a popular pastime, however, there have also
been many fears associated with combining sporting events and gambling.
Because sports gambling has generally been illegal throughout the United
States, the practice of wagering bets on games has primarily been a closeddoor practice between friends and fans.17 For instance, “Analysts estimate
that gamblers in the United States wager as much as $150 billion each year
illegally through bookies and offshore accounts, as well as through less
formal wagers, such as office pools around the men’s NCAA basketball
tournament.”18 Traditionally, professional and amateur sports entities have
resisted broad legalization of sports betting in recognition of the chance that
the outcome of the game will no longer reflect the “struggle of opponents,”
but instead reflect the “betting line or point spread.”19 Too, “Professional
leagues already fight an image problem with drug scandals, commercial
exploitation of cities and fans, racial inequities among players and
administrative personnel, as well as a few gambling scandals involving high
profile players[.]”20 Sports gambling scandals, like Arnold Rothstein paying
12. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1469.
13. See id.
14. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2012).
15. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1469.
16. Eric Meer, Note, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA): A
Bad Bet for the States, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 281, 283 (2012) (citing DAVID G. SCHWARTZ,
CUTTING THE WIRE: GAMBLING PROHIBITION AND THE INTERNET 29–30 (William R.
Eadington ed., 2005)).
17. See id. at 284.
18. Kevin Draper, Tim Arango & Alan Blinder, Indian Tribes Dig In to Gain Their
Share of Sports Betting, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/
sports/sports-betting-indian-casinos.html.
19. James H. Frey, Gambling on Sport: Policy Issues, 8 J. GAMBLING STUD. 351, 358
(1992).
20. Id.
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off members of the Chicago White Sox baseball team to try and throw the
World Series, helped generate the narrative and well-accepted argument
against widespread legalization of sports gambling.21 In addition to the
potential impact on the outcome of games and pressure on athletes, there is
also a concern centered around the impact sports betting can have on fans.
“Opponents [of sports betting] argue that it is particularly addictive and
especially attractive to young people with a strong interest in sports, and in
the past gamblers corrupted and seriously damaged the reputation of
professional and amateur sports.”22 The legislature and leagues took these
worries into consideration to establish a federal regulation—the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act—in an attempt to monitor
and prohibit the further spread of issues associated with gambling and
betting on professional and amateur sporting events.
III. Language and Implications of the Professional
and Amateur Sports Protection Act
The fear of corruption associated with the allowance of sports betting
and the impact on athletes, fans, and game integrity led to the enactment of
the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act in 1992.23 Prior to the
enactment of PASPA, the federal government did not have regulatory
authority over sports gaming as this power was left to the states to
individually regulate. PASPA effectively gave the federal government
power over the states to control the legality of sports gambling throughout
the country, taking away this power from the states almost entirely. Title 28
U.S.C. § 3702 states:
It shall be unlawful for (1) a governmental entity to sponsor,
operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or
compact, or (2) a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or
promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental
entity, a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or
wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly (through the use of
geographical references or otherwise), on one or more
competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes

21. Woo, supra note 5, at 572.
22. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1469–70 (2018).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012).
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participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more
performances of such athletes in such games.24
Some of the largest proponents of the passage of the Act were the
professional and college amateur leagues, specifically the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).25 Within amateur leagues, there
are concerns centered around the notion that student athletes are easily
affected by betting and the appeal of making a quick buck.26 NCAA
officials fear that “kids” are more inclined to throw a game or pay attention
to a betting line because they are more easily influenced by money due to
their immaturity.27 Those in favor of the enactment of PASPA saw
enhanced federal regulation as a way to ensure the protection of the
“integrity of sports by proscribing the development of sports gambling.” 28
Regulation that stopped the growth of sports gambling allowed proponents
of the Act to ensure the security of professional and amateur sports and
protection of athletes moving forward. “PASPA’s legislative history
reflects the law’s three basic goals: (1) to stop the spread of state-sponsored
sports gambling, (2) to maintain sports’ integrity, and (3) to reduce the
promotion of sports gambling among America’s youth.”29 Despite these
policy considerations, those opposed to the enactment of PASPA, including
the Department of Justice, most feared the Act would interrupt the states’
right to regulate their own policies regarding gaming. 30 Notwithstanding
this fear, PASPA was passed, prohibiting states from regulating sports
gaming issues within their own borders—a power the states had historically
held.31
PASPA included a provision that exempted states who allowed for sports
betting between 1976 and 1990 from the authoritative and restrictive

24. Id. Definitions for the Act are included in 28 U.S.C. § 3701 (2012)).
25. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1470.
26. Adam Edelman, As States Race to Launch Sports Betting, Calls Grow for Congress
to Protect Games’ Integrity, NBC NEWS (May 14, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/politics-news/states-race-launch-sports-betting-calls-grow-congress-protect-gamesn874051.
27. See id.
28. Woo, supra note 5, at 575 (quoting Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act—Policy Concerns Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5
(1992)).
29. Meer, supra note 16, at 288; see S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 4–5 (1991), as reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3553–55.
30. Id.
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012).
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language of the Act.32 Title 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a) provides that § 3702 shall
not apply to numerous categories of gaming and wagering, “to the extent
that the scheme was conducted by that State or other governmental entity at
any time during the period beginning January 1, 1976, and ending August
31, 1990[.]”33 When PASPA was passed, Nevada, Oregon, Delaware, and
Montana all had some form of sports gaming operation in place.34 This
provision allowed these select states to continue operating sports betting
schemes that began before PASPA.35 Section 3704(a)(3)(A)–(B) of the Act
further permitted other states, like New Jersey, a one-year grace period
during which the state could legalize sports gambling before the regulation
of PASPA would prohibit them from doing so.36 The Act provided an
exemption for gaming schemes implemented in municipal casinos within
one year of the Act’s effective date, so long as the municipality previously
operated a “commercial casino gaming scheme” throughout the ten years
leading up to the effective date, “pursuant to a comprehensive system of
State regulation authorized by that State’s constitution and applicable solely
to such municipality[.]”37
The language presented is best referred to as a “grandfather” provision
that permitted sports gaming activities to continue in states where sports
gambling was previously legal, and similarly allowed other states the
opportunity to legalize sports gambling activities within a one year period
after the Act’s effective date.38 Despite New Jersey’s historic relationship
with gambling and Atlantic City’s appeal to gamblers, the state was forced
to comply with PASPA when the state failed to pass legislation within the
one-year grace period.39
A. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Christie—2012 Act
The constraints of PASPA tied the states’ hands from making their own
decisions regarding sports betting, which led New Jersey to challenge the
Act. At the time PASPA was ultimately passed and enacted, New Jersey did
not see the need to take advantage of § 3704(a)(3)(A)–(B), which would
32. Id. § 3704.
33. Id. § 3704(a)(1).
34. Meer, supra note 16, at 287.
35. Id.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3)(A); see also Meer, supra note 16, at 287.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3)(A)–(B).
38. Id. § 3704(a)(1)–(3); Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461,
1471 (2018).
39. Meer, supra note 16, at 289; see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1471.
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have allowed for the enactment of some form of legislation regarding sports
betting in the state.40 By failing to act within the window of opportunity
provided by the Act, New Jersey missed its chance for state regulation of
sports betting to continue. In 2011, Atlantic City began facing tourism
competition once again, which lead the state to decide they wanted to allow
sports betting in casinos throughout the state after holding a series of public
hearings on the issue.41 The legislature then drafted a referendum seeking
public approval to amend the New Jersey Constitution to allow sports
betting, which was favored by 64% of New Jersey voters.42 After receiving
approval from voters, the legislature enacted the “Sports Wagering Act,”
known as the “2012 Act.”43 The 2012 Act directly conflicted with the
restrictions set forth in PASPA because the 2012 Act legalized sports
betting in “privately owned casinos and racetracks located in the state [of
New Jersey].”44 The 2012 Act was largely opposed by the NCAA and other
major league sports entities, such as the National Basketball Association
(NBA), National Hockey League (NHL), National Football League (NFL),
and the office of the Commissioner of Baseball, who together brought an
action in federal court.45 The parties jointly sued the Governor of New
Jersey at the time, Christopher Christie, and other New Jersey state
officials.46
The sports entities collectively opposed the 2012 Act on the grounds that
it violated the regulations proscribed in PASPA.47 In return, “[t]he State and
other Defendants who intervened in the case, argue[d] that PASPA
violate[d] the federal Constitution and cannot be used by the Leagues to
prevent the implementation of legalized sports wagering.”48 The District
Court Judge disagreed with the State’s argument, stating that they are
40. See David D. Waddell & Douglas L. Minke, Why Doesn’t Every Casino Have a
Sports Book?, GLOBAL GAMING BUS., July 2008, at 36, http://www.rmclegal.com/
docs/media/Why%20doesnt%20every%20casino%20have%20a%20sports%20betting.pdf.
41. Axel Schamis & Katherine Van Bramer, Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.: SUP. CT. BULL., https://www.law.
cornell.edu/supct/cert/16-476 (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1471 (2018).
48. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 554 (D.N.J.), aff’d
sub nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir.
2013).
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required to “adopt an interpretation that would deem the statute
constitutional so long as that reading is reasonable.”49 In doing so, the
district court found that PASPA, under the Commerce Clause, was a
reasonable expression of Congress’s powers.50 The court found it important
that the Act allowed for states to continue operating their sports betting
regimes if they existed prior to the enactment.51 Next, the court considered
the Tenth Amendment’s “anticommandeering” principles, an argument
articulated by the State.52 The Anticommandeering doctrine requires the
Federal Government to “neither issue directives requiring the States to
address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of
their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program.”53 The district court, as well as the Third Circuit, found that
PASPA was not an anticommandeering Tenth Amendment violation
because it did not “force New Jersey to take any legislative, executive or
regulatory action[]”—siding with the NCAA’s argument.54 The court in
NCAA v. Christie also noted that Congress satisfied the necessary
requirements for rational basis when enacting PASPA.55 The Third Circuit
panel noted the provisions of PASPA did not require the states to “lift a
finger”56, honing in on the idea that the Act “only prohibits affirmative
authorizations and does not prohibit repeals.”57 New Jersey then filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari that was ultimately denied review by the
Supreme Court.58
B. Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association—2014 Act
In 2014, New Jersey decided to once again wager on the issue of
PASPA’s constitutionality by enacting new sports gaming legislation.59
Senate Bill 2460, referred to as the 2014 Act, took the Third Circuit’s
suggestion in NCAA v. Christie wherein the court stated, “not [to] read
PASPA [as] prohibit[ing] New Jersey from repealing its ban on sport

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 554–55.
Id. at 555.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 555.
Id.
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1471 (2018).
Schamis & Bramer, supra note 41.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1472.
S.B. 2460, 206th Leg., First Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2014).
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wagering.”60 Further, the 2014 Act used words taken from the United
States’ brief to the Supreme Court opposing New Jerseys’ petition for writ
of certiorari regarding the 2012 Act against them, by quoting: “PASPA
does not even obligate New Jersey to leave in place the state-law
prohibitions against sports gambling that it had chosen to adopt prior to
PASPA’s enactment. To the contrary, New Jersey is free to repeal those
prohibitions in whole or in part.”61 The New Jersey legislature did just that.
The 2014 Act was framed as a “repealer” and thus “repeal[ed] the
provisions of state law prohibiting sports gambling insofar as they
concerned the ‘placement and acceptance of wagers’ on sporting events by
persons 21 years of age or older at a horseracing track or a casino or
gambling house in Atlantic City.”62 Within the 2014 Act’s language, the
legislators specified that collegiate sports and athletic events shall not
include events that take place in New Jersey or involve New Jersey teams,
which one can assume was to protect athletes and New Jersey sports’
integrity.63 The legislature’s clever use of the Third Circuit’s language and
the United States amicus brief argument to craft their bill ultimately
promoted the same reaction from the original plaintiffs in NCAA v. Christie,
and another suit was brought against the state for PASPA violations.64 The
NCAA argued the 2014 Act, although framed as a repealer, was in fact an
affirmative authorization of sports betting because it allowed for the
removal of the prohibition on sports betting in particular locations.65 The
district court reached the same conclusion as with the 2012 Act, finding the
2014 Act violated the federal regulations set forth in PASPA.66 The case
was next heard and affirmed by the Third Circuit Court sitting en banc.67
When evaluating the case, the court looked to what the law “actually d[id]”
and concluded that the repeal was an authorization because the selective
removal in certain locations “permissively channel[ed] wagering.”68 The
60. Id. (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d
208, 232 (3d Cir. 2013)).
61. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States in Opposition at 11, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 554 (D.N.J. 2013) (Nos. 13-967, 13-979, 13-980)).
62. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1472.
63. Act of Oct. 27, 2014, ch. 62, 2014 N.J. Laws 602, 602.
64. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1472.
65. Schamis & Bramer, supra note 41.
66. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 577 (D.N.J.),
aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d
Cir. 2013).
67. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d at 215.
68. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1472.
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court further concluded that the language of PASPA did not violate the
principles of the anticommandeering doctrine because it “d[id] not
command states to take affirmative actions.”69 Despite the outcome of the
lower courts, the 2014 Act increased New Jersey’s odds and the Supreme
Court granted the State’s petition for certiorari to review the question of the
constitutionality of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act in
2018.70
IV. Issue Before the Supreme Court: Murphy v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association
On certiorari review, the issue before the Supreme Court was “the
constitutionality of the PASPA provision prohibiting States from
‘author[izing]’ sports gambling.”71 To begin, the Court examined the
meaning of the Act, noting that Respondents and the United States (acting
as an amicus for Respondent NCAA) seemed to understand that under
Petitioners’ interpretation of the provision at issue, the provision would in
fact be unconstitutional.72 Petitioners argued the provision required states to
keep their laws against sports gambling untouched, acting as an antiauthorization provision.73 Further, the State argued that “permit” is a
generally accepted synonym of “authorize,” meaning that “any state law
that has the effect of permitting sports gambling, including a law totally or
partially repealing a prior prohibition, amounts to an authorization.”74
While on the other hand, Respondents contended that authorization is to be
construed more narrowly to require an actual affirmative action.75
According to Respondents, the 2014 Act encouraged affirmative action by
giving entities the authority to implement sports gaming operations in the
State of New Jersey, instead of looking at it as a repeal of previous
language.76 After evaluating both views, the Court accepted Petitioner’s
interpretation.77 The Court agreed that “[w]hen a State completely or
partially repeals old laws banning sports gambling, it ‘authorize[s]’ that
69. Id. at 1473 (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832
F.3d 389, 401 (2016)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioners at 42, Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (No. 16-476)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1474.
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activity.”78 The Court maintained that repealing a law banning sports
gaming gives way to the right to act on betting operations.79
The Supreme Court went on to explain in its analysis that, even if the
interpretation offered by Respondents was accepted, the Act’s provision
would still violate the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering doctrine.80
The primary argument for the State was the intentional limitation of
congressional authority. Federalism, or the balance between federal and
state sovereignty shown through the principle of the anticommandeering
doctrine, provides that legislative powers granted to Congress preempt state
law if they are directly at conflict, but powers not specifically enumerated
to Congress by the United States Constitution are reserved for the states.81
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, noted that "conspicuously absent
from the list of powers given to Congress is the power to issue direct orders
to the governments of the States.”82 Further, the Court stated, “The
legalization of sports gambling requires an important policy choice, but the
choice is not ours to make. Congress can regulate sports gambling directly,
but if it elects not to do so, each state is free to act on its own[.]"83 The
Court contended that PASPA § 3702(1) violated this doctrine because it
“unequivocally dictate[d] what a state legislature may and may not do.”84
“The Court also explained that there was no meaningful difference between
directing a state legislature to enact a new law or prohibiting a state
legislature from doing so, and PASPA’s anti-authorization provision
violated the anticommandeering principle because it specifically mandated
what a state could and could not do.”85 Additionally, the Court quickly
addressed the issue of preemption, stating “every form of preemption is
based on federal law that regulates the conduct of private actors, not the
States.”86 Thus, the Court held that PASPA’s prohibition clause is not a
“preemption provision because there is no way in which this provision can
be understood as a regulation of private actors.”87

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1475.
81. Id. at 1476.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1484–85.
84. Id. at 1478.
85. Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/
cases/2017/16-476 (last visited Jan. 3, 2019).
86. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1481.
87. Id.
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This conclusion led the Court to next consider the question of
severability.88 Petitioners claimed that the entire Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act was “doomed” given the unconstitutionality of §
3702(1).89 The Court responded, in sum, that in order for the law to remain
intact, it must be “fully operative” despite loss of the invalid provision and
cannot result in a different effect then was the original intent of Congress.90
“For instance, other provisions of [PASPA], which were not challenged in
this case, prohibited state-run sports lotteries and prohibited privately run
sports betting. [Justice] Alito reasoned that Congress would not have
intended those provisions to stand in the absence of the challenged
provision.”91 Analyzing the Act, coupled with the original intent of
Congress, the Court concluded “no provision of PASPA is severable from
the provision directly at issue in these cases.”92 Meaning PASPA could not
stand on its own without the prohibition provision. Justice Ginsburg wrote
the dissenting opinion that was joined in full by Justice Sotomayor and in
part by Justice Breyer. The dissenting Justices were largely dissatisfied with
the majority’s failure to recoup the statute instead of overruling PASPA as a
whole. The dissenting Justices asserted that, “Deleting the alleged
‘commandeering’ directions would free the statute to accomplish just what
Congress legitimately sought to achieve: stopping sports-gambling regimes
while making it clear that the stoppage is attributable to federal, not state,
action.”93
Although sports gambling historically has been a controversial topic, the
Court held in a 6-3 decision that Congress has no authority to regulate what
is currently within the power of the state governments to decide.94 The
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act infringes on the authority
of the states, by attempting to “regulate[] state governments’ regulation of
their citizens.”95 Though Murphy v. NCAA stands as important decision for
the sports world, the holding’s true constitutional value is that
“Murphy makes explicit what Printz and New York implied: the anticommandeering rule applies with equal force whether Congress
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1482; 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (2012).
90. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1482.
91. Murphy v. NCAA, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Murphy_v._NCAA (last
visited Dec. 29, 2018).
92. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484.
93. Id. at 1490 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 1484–85.
95. Id. at 1485.
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affirmatively directs a state to act or prohibits a state from doing so.” 96
PASPA violated the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering doctrine
given its restrictive and regulatory language over state rights, and thus, the
Supreme Court overturned the ruling of the lower courts and threw out
PASPA altogether.97 The Court’s decision in Murphy meant that New
Jersey finally won the jackpot.
V. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
With the downfall of PASPA came the question of how the integrity of
sports could best be protected notwithstanding the loss of federal
regulation. Despite the history of heavy tribal gaming regulation in the
United States, tribal gaming is only mentioned once in the opinion written
by Justice Alito regarding the constitutionality of the Act.98 In fact, tribal
gaming is only referred to in the introductory material, noting merely “the
enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988” and the positive
affect the Act had on the spread of casinos.99 Though the Court recognized
the important role Indian tribes played in the growth of casino gambling
across the country, the Court completely failed to discuss their future.
President Ronald Reagan signed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA) into law largely to protect “the sovereign rights of Indian tribes.”100
The IGRA has three primary goals, which are defined in 25 U.S.C §
2702.101 The first is to provide a regulatory basis for Indian gaming in order
to promote the development of strong tribal economy and government. 102
The second purpose is to shield tribes from “organized crime” while
ensuring they are the beneficiaries of gaming revenues.103 Lastly, the IGRA
was enacted “to declare [] the establishment of independent Federal
regulatory authority for gaming on Indian lands, the establishment of
Federal standards for gaming on Indian lands, and the establishment of a
National Indian Gaming Commission.”104 The establishment of the IGRA
96. Mark Brnovich, Betting on Federalism: Murphy v. NCAA and the Future of Sports
Gambling, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 247, 266–67.
97. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 1469.
100. Franklin Ducheneaux, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Background and
Legislative History, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 99, 182 (2010).
101. 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012).
102. Id. § 2702(1).
103. Id. § 2702(2).
104. Id. § 2702(3).
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was necessary to address concerns involving gaming and how to protect
gaming operations, as tribal gaming regimes were, and remain, an
important source of tribal revenue.105
Congress recognized casino gaming as a unique means to an end,
creating a prosperous source of revenue for Indian tribes throughout the
United States.106 At large, the IGRA acts as a “compromise” between the
“competing interest” of “tribal needs and state concerns.”107 The Act
divides gaming into three distinct classes—I,II, and III—and each class has
its own set of regulatory tools and procedures.108 Class I gaming refers to
“social games,” where the prizes are minimal or the games are connected to
“tribal ceremonies or celebrations.”109 Class II encompasses gaming such as
bingo and card games authorized by state laws.110 The last grouping, class
III gaming, is a catchall category that includes “all forms of gaming that are
not class I [] or class II [].”111 Typically, class III games are those
commonly played at casinos, such as black jack, craps, and slot
machines.112 Class III games require authorization outside of the norm
required for classes I and II.113 Tribal gaming operations that wish to
operate class III gaming schemes must be:
(A) authorized by an ordinance or resolution that—
(i) is adopted by the governing body of the Indian tribe having
jurisdiction over such lands,
(ii) meets the requirements of subsection (b), and
(iii) is approved by the Chairman,
(B) located in a State that permits such gaming for any
purpose by any person, organization, or entity, and

105. Id.
106. Ducheneaux, supra note 100, at 182–83.
107. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 200
A.L.R. Fed. 367 (2005).
108. 25 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
109. Id. § 2703(6).
110. Id. § 2703(7)(A)(i)–(ii).
111. Id. § 2703(8).
112. Steven J. Gunn, Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (1988), ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM,
https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/united-states-and-canada/north-american-indigenouspeoples/indian-gaming-regulatory-act (last updated Oct. 14, 2019).
113. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012).
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(C) conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact
entered into by the Indian tribe and the State under paragraph (3)
that is in effect.114
The IGRA allows states and Indian tribes to negotiate compacts. Tribalstate compacts govern gaming activities on Indian lands and allow for any
state and any Indian tribe to enter into an agreement for casino gaming,
pursuant to the terms of the IGRA.115 Within Indian country, tribal-state
compacts “govern[] the operation of Class III gaming enterprises . . . as
Congress chose not to unilaterally impose state law and state jurisdiction
over Indian gaming.”116 One appeal for states that opt into tribal-state
compacts is the potential for revenue sharing. Compacts that account for
revenue sharing allow states to address budget deficits, but in return require
that tribes are given “substantial exclusivity for Indian gaming in the
state.”117 Approved revenue sharing payment plans maintain that the benefit
received by the state should not exceed the benefit of the tribe, as such
payment would violate the IGRA.118 There are at least ten states whose
tribal compacts provide for a revenue sharing scheme in exchange for
exclusivity of gaming operations.119 An exclusivity provision normally
requires states to “prohibit[] non-Indian gaming from competing with
Indian gaming or [] agree[] to relinquish payments if non-Indian gaming is
permitted by the state in the future.”120 Those tribes with exclusivity
provisions stand to benefit from the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy
regarding sports betting.

114. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(A)–(C) (emphasis added).
115. Id. § 2710.
116. G. William Rice, Some Thoughts on the Future of Indian Gaming, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
219, 224 (2010).
117. Katie Eidson, Note, Will States Continue to Provide Exclusivity in Tribal Gaming
Compacts or Will Tribes Bust on the Hand of the State in Order to Expand Indian Gaming,
29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 319, 326 (2004–2005) (citing the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001)).
118. Id.
119. Dave Palermo, Tribes Scramble to Figure Out How Sports Betting Can Fit into
Indian Gambling Under Federal Law, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Aug. 4, 2017, 11:50 AM),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/14890/tribes-sports-betting-and-federal-law/.
120. Eidson, supra note 117, at 328 (quoting Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior,
Department of the Interior).
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VI. The Fall of PASPA and the Opportunity for Indian Tribes
The Supreme Court’s decision to scrap PASPA brings about a unique
opportunity for the expansion of sports betting in tribal gaming operations
across the country, as their established success and regulation makes Indian
tribes ideal bookies. As of 2015, 238 gaming tribes operated 474 Indian
gaming operations across the country.121 Of those 474 gaming operations,
317 allowed for both class II and III games.122 It is important to note that 25
C.F.R. § 502.4 places sports betting within class III gaming, meaning that
the federal government classifies sports betting as a class III gaming
operation.123 Because PASPA prevented states from implementing new
gambling laws related to sports activities,124 the Supreme Court’s decision
in Murphy effectively restored power back to the states, allowing them to
once again decide for themselves whether to permit sports betting
operations within their borders.125 Another possibility for growth in sports
betting operations stems from tribal-state gaming compacts already in place
for class III gaming operations on tribal land, assuming that federal
legislation involving sports betting regulation is not enacted.126 When the
Supreme Court rendered its decision in Murphy, Chris Grove, the managing
director at Eilers & Krejcik (a gaming sector research firm), predicted that
some thirty-two states would see the legislature moving forward state laws
in favor of sports betting.127 As of November 1, 2019, thirteen states have
authorized either full scale sports betting or some form of legalized sports
gambling, including: Nevada, Delaware, New Jersey, Mississippi, West
Virginia, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Arkansas, New York,
Iowa, Oregon, and Indiana.128 Numerous other states have passed bills, or
are currently waiting on introduced bills to be passed.129 Three days after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy v. NCAA, New Jersey Governor
Phil Murphy took action and signed the 2014 Act (at issue in Murphy v.
121. NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMM’N, FACTS AT A GLANCE (2016), https://www.
nigc.gov/images/uploads/NIGC%20Uploads/aboutus/2016FactSheet-web.pdf.
122. Id.
123. 25 C.F.R. § 502.4(c) (2019).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012).
125. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
126. See id.
127. Edelman, supra note 26.
128. Ryan Rodenberg, United States of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of Where Every
State Stands, ESPN (Aug. 2, 2019), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19740480/theunited-states-sports-betting-where-all-50-states-stand-legalization.
129. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss1/6

No. 1]

NOTES

157

NCAA) into law allowing for sports wagering at Monmouth Park and
Borgata Casino.130 Additionally, New Jersey implemented several online
sports betting services and apps since the overturn of PASPA, including
DraftKings Sportsbook, playMGM mobile app, Sugarhouse Online
Sportsbook & Casino, William Hill, FanDuel, 888 Sport, and BetStars. 131
After taking down PASPA, New Jersey capitalized on its power to choose
its own sports betting destiny by quickly adding ways to participate in
sports gambling throughout the state.
As for tribal gaming, it is difficult to predict how the dissolution of
PASPA will affect tribal-state compacts. Each compact is different, and the
way in which states and tribes will operate as to the implementation of
sports betting will depend on the particular language of each individual
compact.132 Put simply, there is no bright line rule for tribes across the
United States regarding sports betting.133 In New Mexico, “any or all forms
of Class III Gaming” is included in their tribal compacts.134 Pursuant to the
federal placement of sports betting within class III gaming operations, the
state was able to quickly implement sports betting without amending tribal
compacts or the state constitution.135 After the Court’s decision in Murphy
v. NCAA, the Santa Ana Star Casino & Hotel—a tribal gaming operation in
New Mexico—formed an agreement with USBooking to create a “Nevadastyle sports betting service.”136 A key fact to the introduction of this
sportsbooking venue in New Mexico is that sports betting and gambling is
currently illegal in the state outside of tribal land.137 The language of the
tribal-state compact enabled the Tribe to act swiftly to bring sports betting
to the casino without much hassle because the existing compact already
provided for all forms of class III gaming.138 But, an area of conflict and
130. Legal US Online Sports Betting and Mobile Betting Apps, PLAYUSA,
https://www.playusa.com/sports-betting/ (last updated Oct. 18, 2019).
131. Id.
132. Palermo, supra note 119.
133. Id.
134. Rodenberg, supra note 128.
135. Id.
136. Robert Mann, USBookmaking Partners with Tribal Casino to Offer New Mexico
Sports Betting, SPORTSHANDLE (Oct. 8, 2018), https://sportshandle.com/usbookmakingpartners-with-tribal-casino-to-offer-new-mexico-sports-betting/.
137. Legal US Online Sports Betting and Mobile Betting Apps, supra note 130. A
“sportsbook” is an “establishment that takes bets on sporting events and pays out winnings.”
See Sportsbook Definition, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/sportsbook (last
visited Nov. 19, 2019).
138. 25 C.F.R. § 502.4 (2019).
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concern also arises from the state’s tribal-state compact. “[New Mexico]
has agreements with 18 tribes . . . that allow the state to run lottery games
while still honoring the pacts.”139 Pursuant to the language of the compacts,
New Mexico plans to implement a lottery game involving sports, most
likely a form of “parlay wagering.”140 Issues like these will continue to
define the balance between state, federal, and tribal power over sports
betting.
The situation in New Mexico exemplifies the issues likely to arise in
states that have Indian gaming operations through compacts. For instance,
one issue is whether states with exclusivity agreements are bound to only
allow for the implementation of sports betting within tribal gaming
operations, or if states will be able to operate sports wagering on their
own—despite these exclusivity compacts. Also, will states and tribes be
forced to amend their compacts to allow for sports gaming or will the IGRA
be amended to speak on the issue of sports betting? It is clear from the
Supreme Court’s decision regarding PASPA that states once again possess
the authority to decide on the issue of sports betting given the Tenth
Amendments anticommandeering principles. The federal authority of the
IGRA also makes it clear that tribal-state compacts that do not provide
tribes with exclusive rights to gaming in their state run the risk of states
implementing and operating sports betting on their own, rather than
allowing the tribes the exclusive right to bring sports betting into their
current operations.141 The decision in Murphy v. NCAA will require many
tribes to rework their compacts in order to ensure that the language includes
the ability to offer sports betting within Indian Country gaming
operations.142 Without language specifically granting all gaming authority
to the tribe, or language allowing the tribe to operate sports betting (such as
“all class III gaming”), it is likely the state will be able to implement sports
betting outside of Indian Country.143 Likewise, tribes should be able to
bring in sports betting opportunities through good faith compact
negotiations even if the state chooses not to enact laws regarding sports

139. Jill R. Dorson, New Mexico Lottery to Offer Game Tied to Sports, SPORTSHANDLE
(Nov. 1, 2018), https://sportshandle.com/new-mexico-lottery-to-offer-game-tied-to-sports/.
140. Id.
141. Andrew Westney, High Court Sports Bet Ruling Could Mean Bonanza for Tribes,
LAW360 (May 14, 2018, 9:53 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1043408/high-courtsports-bet-ruling-could-mean-bonanza-for-tribes (via subscription).
142. Id.
143. Id.
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betting.144 Larry S. Roberts, former Acting Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs, stated that “[tribes with exclusivity compacts for all class III
gaming] may take the position that sports betting falls under that exclusivity
provision, and if the state authorizes it for any entity that’s not a tribal
entity, that that violates the exclusivity provisions[.]”145
Despite the fact that the answer to how, where, and if sports betting will
be implemented may take time to unfold given the differences in compacts
and all fifty states’ right to choose once again on the issue of sports betting,
the original policy considerations associated with gambling and sporting
events might provide some guidance as to the “right” answer. The
foundation of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
encompassed the primary policy concern of protecting the integrity of
sports.146 The proponents of PASPA argued that federal regulation would
not only protect the integrity of American sports, but would also protect
fans from gambling addiction and the serious threat of corruption associated
with betting games.147 Although the Supreme Court effectively threw out
federal regulation of sports betting, leaving open the option for states to act,
the policy concerns that existed before PASPA’s enactment still exist today.
The NCAA, National Basketball Association, and National Football League
should still be concerned with the future of sports and the effects of
legalized betting. In 2014, before the Court’s decision in Murphy, NBA
Commissioner Adam Silver wrote an opinion on the legalization and
regulation of sports betting for the New York Times.148 Although somewhat
uncharacteristic of the commissioner of a large sports entity, Silver shared
that he believed PASPA should be overturned because of “domestic and
global trends.”149 Silver noted that although restrictions were in place to
prevent sports betting, its practice was in fact widespread in the United
States.150 “There is an obvious appetite among sports fans for a safe and
legal way to wager on professional sporting events. Mainstream media
outlets regularly publish sports betting lines and point spreads.”151 Silver’s
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Palermo, supra note 119.
Westney, supra note 141.
See 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012).
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1471 (2018).
See generally Adam Silver, Opinion, Legalize and Regulate Sports Betting, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/opinion/nba-commissioneradam-silver-legalize-sports-betting.html?_r=0.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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request did not come without restraints and restrictions, as he stated that
“Congress should adopt a federal framework that allows states to authorize
betting on professional sports, subject to strict regulatory requirements and
technological safeguards.”152 The Commissioner’s call for regulatory
requirements was to “ensure the integrity of the game.”153 The issue of
integrity is clearly a reoccurring theme and argument for protecting the
sports industry. The idea behind PASPA, or a call for federal regulation in
general, is to ensure that integrity is maintained. Although tribal gaming
was left out of the Supreme Court’s opinion as a solution, it unquestionably
exists as a regulatory scheme capable of maintaining and monitoring the
honor of the sports industry. The IGRA established a framework, both tribal
and federal in nature, to monitor and regulate Indian gaming known as the
National Indian Gaming Association (NIGA).154 NIGA’s mission is “to
protect and preserve the general welfare of tribes striving for selfsufficiency through gaming enterprises in Indian Country[]” by working
with “the federal government and Congress to develop sound policies and
practices and to provide technical assistance and advocacy on gamingrelated issues.”155 The mission of the NIGA also includes protecting “Indian
sovereign governmental authority in Indian Country.”156 When PASPA was
struck down, the NIGA announced that in their advocacy role they would
ensure that certain policies and principles regarding sports betting were
adhered to:
Tribes have governmental authority to regulate gaming; Sports
betting revenues will not be subject to taxation for Tribal
Governments; Customers access for Tribes is permissible where
Sports Betting is legal; Tribal rights under IGRA and Gaming
Compacts are protected; IGRA will not be opened up for
amendments; Tribal Governments receive a positive economic
benefit in any federal Sports Betting legalization proposals;
Indian Tribes have the right to opt in to a federal regulatory
scheme to ensure access to broad-based markets; Integrity and
protection of the game and patron protections are of high
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Ernest L. Stevens, Jr., Impacts for Indian Gaming from the Murphy Court’s PASPA
Ruling, INDIAN GAMING, June 2018, at 14, 14, http://www.indiangaming.com/istore/
Jun18_SpeakOut.pdf.
155. About Us, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, https://www.indiangaming.org/about (last
visited Jan. 10, 2019).
156. Id.
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importance; Any consideration of Mobile, on-line or internet
gaming must also adhere to these principles.157
These principles offered by the NIGA suggest that their goal is to maintain
the integrity of Native gaming operations, while also maintaining the policy
goals and regulatory ideals of those who support regulations of sports
betting.158 In states where tribal-state gaming exclusivity compacts are
prevalent, a regulatory scheme is essentially already in place. Ernest L.
Stevens, Jr. made the argument that Indian Country is suited to handle
issues of gaming regulation and is the only gaming operation that maintains
and works with a federal agency.159 “Indian gaming is the most highly
regulated form of gaming in the United States. Tribes spent more than $450
million on tribal, federal, and state regulation of Indian gaming in 2017
alone.”160 If federal legislation were to be enacted, the hope of the Tribes is
that they are given a seat at the table, because their current infrastructure
could benefit from the addition of sports betting and the integrity of sports
betting could thrive under the existing Indian tribal gaming regulations.
A question that remains for Indian tribes is whether or not sports betting
is a gambling industry in which they want to enter. Although the image that
comes to mind of the Nevada sports betting industry, and the fun to be had
when gambling with friends and other fans might insinuate that this is a
profitable market, the NIGA leaders suggest that support for sports betting
among tribal leaders is divided.161 Many believe, based upon the popularity
of sports betting, that it could bring about greater prosperity for tribes, but
in reality sports betting is a low-profit market.162 For example, in 2017,
Nevada sportsbooks only contributed 2.4% of the total gaming revenue
within the state.163 Commission Chairman Jonodev Osceola Chaundhuri
stated that “[t]here’s a broad spectrum in Indian Country covering two
extremes: Tribal nations that would not benefit at all, and on the other end,
157. Sport Betting Notice, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, https://indiangaming.org/news/
sport-betting-notice (last visited Jan. 10, 2019).
158. See id.
159. Stevens, supra note 154.
160. Id.
161. Nick Sortal, Some Indian Casinos Cautious About Sports Wagering, CDC GAMING
REP. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cdcgamingreports.com/commentaries/some-indiancasinos-cautious-about-sports-wagering/.
162. Regina Garcia Cano, Indian Casinos Across US Wary of Betting on Sports Books,
FOX26 NEWS (Dec. 26, 2018), https://kmph.com/sports/content/indian-casinos-across-uswary-of-betting-on-sports-books-12-26-2018.
163. Id.
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tribal nations that would significantly benefit[.]”164 Experts suggest that less
than one hundred tribal gaming operations would create a sportsbook
operation because so many tribal gaming operations are too small,
operating more so as a job program than a money-making operation.165 In
addition to considering the language of their present compacts, the potential
need for amendments, the likelihood of new state laws, and the possibility
of future federal regulation, Indian tribes must consider their stance on
sports betting as it relates to their current operations.
VII. Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy v. NCAA to strike down
PASPA corrected a mistake of Congress. The language of PASPA
prohibiting states from authorizing sports betting and gambling operations
was a clear violation of the Tenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. The anticommandeering rule maintains that Congress may not
simply take the legislative process away from the states by forcing them
into federal regulatory programs.166 The opportunity for Indian tribes to
explore sports betting is extremely important where compacts allow for all
class III gaming operations, or where exclusivity provisions are provided in
tribal-state gaming compacts. Because the IGRA is a balance between both
federal and tribal power, Indian gaming remains the most highly regulated
gaming scheme in the country. For those who criticize the lack of federal
regulation of sports betting and wish to maintain the integrity of the game
through regulation, Indian tribal gaming offers a swift and efficient solution
where renegotiation of tribal compacts is not necessary. New Jersey’s
willingness to place its bet on the unconstitutionality of PASPA allows
states, and Indian tribes, to once again go all in on sports betting operations
if they choose to do so.

164. Id.
165. Sortal, supra note 161.
166. Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, supra note 85.
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